























Center for Operations Research 
and Econometrics 
 





 CORE DISCUSSION PAPER   
2009/59 
 
All-pay auctions with endogenous rewards 
 








This paper examines a perfectly discriminating contest (all-pay auction) with two asymmetric 
players. Valuations are endogenous and depend on the effort each player invests in the contest. 
The shape of the valuation function is common knowledge and differs between the contestants. 
Some key properties of R&D races, lobbying activity and sport contests are captured by this 
framework. Once the unique equilibrium in mixed strategies analyzed, we derive a closed form of 
the expected expenditure of both players. We characterize the expected expenditure by the means 
of incomplete Beta functions. We focus on unordered valuations. 
Keywords:.all-pay auctions, contests 
JEL Classification: D44, D72 
                                                           
1 PSE-Paris School of Economics, France. E-mail: bos@pse.ens.fr 
2 University of Bonn, Germany. E-mail: martin.ranger@uni-bonn.de 
 
The  first  author  thanks  the  University  of  Bonn  and  CORE  (Université  catholique  de  Louvain)  for  their 
hospitality and acknowledges financial support from the European Commission (Marie-Curie Fellowship). We 
would like to thank Atsu Amegashie, Raouf Boucekkine, Gabrielle Demange, Aner Sela and Ron Siegel for 
their valuable comments, discussions and remarks. All remaining errors are our. 
This paper presents research results of the Belgian Program on Interuniversity Poles of Attraction initiated by 
the  Belgian  State,  Prime  Minister's  Office,  Science  Policy  Programming.  The  scientific  responsibility  is 
assumed by the authors. 1 Introduction
Although commonly assumed to be xed, the size of the prize in a contest may in fact be
endogenous and depend on the eort made by the contestants. In particular, a higher level
of eort may lead to higher valuations.1 In other words, the eort expended in a contest may
increase both the probability of winning and the size of the prize. Moreover, contestants may
dier with respect to the magnitude of this eect and the same eort levels may lead to a
dierent valuation of winning the contest (Kaplan, Luski, Sela, and Wettstein, 2002).
Such an environment is descriptive of several economic issues. In R&D races, for example,
an increase in the amount of resources spent on developing new technologies may result
in a shorter product pipeline and in the rm winning the race. At the same time, the
additional resources may improve the quality of the nal product and therefore its market
value. Asymmetric market structures and dierences in marketing, existing product variety
or spill-over eects to related research projects are likely to lead to dierences in the marginal
value of R&D spending. Organizational dierences in research departments or a dierent
composition of inputs into the research process may likewise lead to dierent values of winning
the race. In some sense, academic hiring eorts may follow a similar pattern. As long as
universities attempt to attract faculty by oering productivity enhancing inducements, such
as research funds, expanded seminar series or access to data sets, they are likely to increase
the productivity of the potential new hire and at the same time the value of being able to
hire the desired candidate.
In the classical example of a lobbying contest, the value of the legislation enacted or the
project awarded may depend on the magnitude of the contribution to the political institution
involved. Asymmetries may enter the contest through the pre-existing political connection
of the lobbyist, so that an organization with conservative credentials would obtain a more
favourable outcome with a conservative government than a more liberal lobbyist. Lastly, in
professional sports, the eort invested by a team increases its expected score making a win
more likely. In addition, conditional on having won the game, a higher score may raise the
reputation of the team. For teams quoted on the stockmarket, such as several European
soccer teams, this may translate into additional stock price gains. Again, dierences between
teams may lead to asymmetries in this eect.
This paper therefore examines the equilibrium of a contest with endogenous rewards and
calculates the aggregate expenditure of the contestants. In contrast to contest where at given
eort levels winning is a probabilistic event (Tullock contests), we examine a contest modelled
as an all-pay auction, that is a situation in which the contestant investing the largest eort
1Higher eort levels can also lead to a lower value of winning a contest. In a war of attrition, for example,
the eort spent to win is likely to make the winner more vulnerable in future conicts and contestants prefer
to win at lower eort levels.
1will win with certainty. Regardless of whether they won or not, all contestants have to pay
their eort cost. Information is assumed to be complete and valuations are asymmetric and
endogenous. For simplicity, the analysis is limited to two participants. The payo from
winning the contest, that is the valuation less the cost of eort, is assumed to decline strictly
in eort despite valuations that increase in the invested eort. Similar to traditional all-
pay auctions, the participants in the contest thus prefer to win at lower eort levels. This
assumption contrast with Amegashie (2001) who investigates situations where the returns to
additional expenditures in all-pay auctions exceed the costs and players therefore could aim
to win with higher eorts. Contrary to the case where payos strictly decrease he nds that
a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
A second related paper is Kaplan, Luski, and Wettstein (2003), who investigates a model
of innovation and R&D races with a structure similar to an all-pay auction. Information is
complete, values and innovation cost are time dependent and rms compete in when to bring
the innovation to the market. In consequence, the ususal equivalence of staying out of the
contest and exercising zero eort does not apply. Yet, a closed form solution for expected ag-
gregate expenditure is not given. Siegel (2009a,b) also studies all-pay auctions with complete
information and non-ordered contestants. Although in his papers, the contestants dier in
the cost of competing our framework is closely related to his. The dierences are in the levels
of generality. Whereas Siegel's broad approach covers quite general model specications { in
particular he focus on contests where all-pay auction is a sub-class of contests { our more
specic set-up allows us to characterize the shape of valuations and thus to determine a closed
form solution for expected equilibrium expenditures.2 To the best of our knowledge these are
the only papers dealing with complete information.
A related paper with incomplete information is Kaplan, Luski, Sela, and Wettstein (2002)
who investigate an all-pay auction where the rewards are additively or multiplicatively sepa-
rable in the type of the players. This setting seems well-suited to R&D races, political contest
or lobbying activities. Kaplan, Luski, Sela, and Wettstein (2002) solve for the equilibrium bid
function and link the size of the reward as well as the costs of bidding to the expected sum
of equilibrium bids. Cohen, Kaplan, and Sela (2009) study an all-pay auction with additively
and multiplicatively separable rewards under incomplete information where the designer can
set the shape of the reward function. In particular, they determine that the optimal additively
separable reward is not necessarily positive. In our model, we investigate additively separable
rewards with complete information.
The next section introduces the model and establishes the framework for characterizing
the shape of the endogenous valuations. While valuations are not ordered, they are regular
in the sense that over some range of eort one player has higher valuations while above a
2Siegel (2009b) provides an algorithm to solve equilibrium expenditures in the general framework of Siegel
(2009a).
2certain threshold eort level the valuations of the other player are higher. The existence of
a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies and equilibrium eort levels are derived in Section 3.
Moreover, a closed for solution for the aggregate expected equilibrium expenditure is derived
in Section 4 { this is indeed the main point of this paper.
2 The Model
Consider two players or group of players, i = 1;2 who choose eort levels xi 2 R+ simultane-
ously and independently in a contest. The shape of their valuations is given by ei() : R+ ! R
which species the size of the prize as a funtion of their eort. We assume that ei() is con-
tinous and dierentiable and information about the shape of every player's ei() is common
knowledge at the beginning of the contest. If, for example, ei(xi) = ix
i
i , i and i will be
common knowledge. The valuation of winning the contest Vi for each i = 1;2 consists of a
common element v and the function ei() so that Vi(xi) = v + ei(xi). Both players pay their





Vi(xi)   xi if xi > xj
Vi(xi)
2
  xi if xi = xj
 xi if xi < xj
We make the following two assumptions to characterize our environment.
Assumption 1 (A1). ei(x) is a non-negative and increasing function for all x > 0 and
ei(0) = 0
Assumption 2 (A2). 8x > 0
@ui
@x
(x) < 0, which means that e0
i(x) < 1.
Assumption A1 ensures that { independently of the original level of eort { an increase
in eort has a positive eect on the prize. More research, for example, will lead to a better
product in a patent race; more eort in a football match to a higher score and an improved
reputation of the winning team. This notwithstanding, assumption A2 makes the contestant
prefer winning at lower eort levels. In other words, the net payo from an additional unit
of eort is negative.3
The case where ei(xi) = 0 for all xi corresponds to a pure common value setting. It is
well-known that under these circumstances there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
As Amegashie (2001) has shown, if utility is not monotonically decreasing in eort, a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium exists. Although his framework is dierent, the link between
increasing utility and equilibrium existence is likely to apply to our set-up as well. Assumption
A2 eectively rules out this case even if ei(x)  0. In order to compute explicitly the form
of the aggregate expected equilibrium expenditure for each player a further assumption is
required.
3Weakly decreasing utility funtions are common in all-pay auction even when valuations are constant.
3Assumption 3 (A3). 8i; 8 > 0;8x;9ki  1 such as ei(ix) = kei(x)
This assumption means that an increasing of one unit of the contestant's eort increases
proportionally the variable part of his valuation. Together, assumptions A1 to A3 imply a
specic functional form for the shape of the valuation function ei(), as the following lemma
shows.
Lemma 1. Suppose assumptions A1-A3 hold. Then, there is a unique form for the valuation
function ei() such that ei(xi) = ix
i
i with i  1 and 0 < i < 1.
Proof. The rst part of the proof to determine that the shape of ei(:) is a power function rely
mainly on assumption A3. This kind of proof, even if some other assumptions or axioms are
required as in this paper, is quite known and can be nd in some textbook of mathematics.
Moreover, assumption A1 leads to i > 0;i > 0. Let us assume that i < 1. Then
assumption A2 implies that x > (ii)
1
1 . As by denition the agents' eorts should start
at zero (even with a mass point) there is a contradiction and i  1. As ei(x)0  1 < 0 for all
x it follows that i < 1
i. 
i could be interpreted as the productivity of the eort and i as an elasticity. The reward








Figure 1: Payo of Winning
As valuations are dependent on the eort of the two contestants, they need not be ordered.
In other words, for two dierent eort levels, the ranking of the valuations could be reversed.





i j and Vj(x)  Vi(x) otherwise.
4Non-ordered valuations seem well-suited for the real-world applications that motivate our
analysis. Indeed, with dierent marginal returns to eort in R&D races and or lobbying
or sports contests, the ranking of the valuations depends on eort levels and valuations are
unlikely to be ordered.4
3 Equilibrium Characterization
It is a well known result that all-pay auctions with constant heterogeneous valuations, that
is valuations that are independent of the submitted bids, have a unique equilibrium in mixed
strategies (Hillman and Riley (1989), Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1996) for linear costs,
Che and Gale (1998), Che and Gale (2006), Kaplan and Wettstein (2006) and Vartiainen
(2007) for non-linear cost functions). In recent papers, Siegel (2009a,b) extends this result to
non-ordered contestants in a general framework.
To simplify the notation we dene the \weak" and the \strong" player and denote them
by the subscripts w and s, respectively. The intuition is simple: since payos are falling in
eort by assumption A2 there will be a level of eort after which the payo obtained will
be negative even if the contest is won. The weak player determines the maximum eort any
player is willing to exercise in the contest. At this eort level its utility from winning the
contest is zero; the strong player, in contrast, still obtains a positive payo at the same eort
level.
Denition 1. A player is called \weak" if he determines the maximum eort ~ x in the constest,
that is v +w~ xw   ~ x = 0 and v +s~ xs   ~ x > 0. His opponent is called the \strong" player.






the player i is the \strong player". Otherwise, the player j is the \strong" player and the
maximum eort is given by ~ x such as v+i~ xi   ~ x = 0. Unlike in a standard all-pay auction,
it is not enough for a particular player to have the higher valuation over an interval of x
in order to be the \strong" player. Rather, the relative strength of a player is determined
not only by the dierence between the valuations at a particular x but also { implicitly { by





i j which denes the order of the valuations on each
sub-interval.
It follows from the implicit function theorem that the maximum eort is increasing in w,









w~ xw ln ~ x




< 0 if ~ x < 1
= 0 if ~ x = 1





4The case of ordered valuations is considered in Appendix B.
5The signs follow from assumption A2.
Dene the mixed strategies at the equilibrium by Fi() = P(X  ) for both players
i = s;w. The following proposition determines the unique Nash equilibrium strategies for the
two players and the corresponding equilibrium payos.
Proposition 1. Suppose assumptions A1-A3 hold. Then, the unique Nash equilibrium is in




v + wxw for all x 2 [0; ~ x]
Fw(x) =
v + s~ xs   ~ x + x
v + sxs for all x 2 [0; ~ x]
And the expected equilibrium payos are
u?
s = s~ xs   w~ xw
u?
w = 0
Proof. Let us dene ~ vi(x) = v + ixi   x and ~ ci(x) = x. Then, the bidder's expected utility
could be written as Fi(x)~ vi(x) (1 Fi(x))~ ci(x). Remark that ~ vi and  ~ ci are continuous and
non-increasing, ~ vi(0) = v and limx!+1 ~ vi(x) < 0 and ~ v 1
s (0) > ~ v 1
w (0) = ~ x. Consequently
all assumptions of Siegel (2009b) are satised. In addition that he called the threshold T of
the contest is in our case the maximum eort ~ x of the \weak" bidder. Thus, Theoreom 3 of
Siegel (2009b) can be applied and our result follows. 
Remark that the equilibrium expected payo of the \weak" player is independent of
the parameters of the contestants' value functions. The expected equilibrium payo of the
\strong" depends on its own valuation and, via its equilibrium strategy, on the parameters of
its opponent.
Corollary 1. Suppose assumptions A1-A3 hold. The expected equilibrium payo of the
\strong" player is (i) decreasing in w and (ii) decreasing in w if ~ x > 1 and increasing
otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
This asymmetry in the parameter eects is interesting for its implications. As the payo
of the strong player is given by s~ xs   w~ xw the impact of the reward parameters w and
w comes from two sources. On one hand we can identify a parameter eect from the en-
dogenous valuation of the \weak" player independently of the eort level, in which a higher
w (respectively a smaller w if ~ x < 1 and a higher one if ~ x > 1) reduces the payo of the
\strong" player independent of the eort levels. The maximum eect, on the other hand,
6works through the impact of the relative values of w and w on ~ x. If the maximum eect
and the parameter eect could have contradictory signs, the latter dominates.
It is possible to compare the standard all-pay auction with exogenous valuations Vi(x) = vi
with our setup where Vi(x) = v + ixi.5 Even if rewards lead to either a higher or a lower
valuation than in the standard case of all-pay auction, it is convenient to assume that the
maximum eort is the same in the endogeneous and standard all-pay auctions. Indeed, the
maximum eort could be decided ex ante for example as a limit of the expenditure in an
R&D race. In consequence, in the standard all-pay auction valuations are ordered and the
\weak" contestant is the one with the lowest valuation. She determines her maximum eort
equal to her valuation vw such that vw = ~ x = v + w~ xw. Then, vs, the valuation of the
\strong" contestant is superior to v + w~ xw.
Corollary 2. The expected equilibrium payo of the \strong" player in the all-pay auction
with endogenous rewards is lower than in a standard all-pay auction if and only if her valuation
vs is superior to v + s~ xs.
This result comes from the comparison of the players' expected equilibrium payo given by
Proposition 1 and the contestants' expected equilibrium payo given by Hillman and Riley
(1989) and Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1996) in the standard all-pay auction which is
vs   vw for the \strong" player.
4 Aggregate Expenditures
Given the assumptions made and with the resulting equilibrium strategies, it is now possible to
nd an explicit expression for the expected equilibrium expenditure of both contestants by the
means of the incomplete Beta functions. We present a very short overview of the incomplete
Beta functions which are a useful tool for the computations of the expected revenues. The
incomplete Beta functions belongs to the general class of hypergeometric functions and are
studied in details Spanier and Oldham (1987) Chapter 58 (see also Temme (1996) for a more
recent textbook).
Denition 2. The incomplete Beta function, B(;;x), with 0  x < 1; 2 R; > 0, is






5The analysis does not change if the exogenous part of the valuations vi is not common to both contestants
and Vi(x) = vi + ix
i.
7Denition 3. The incomplete Beta function, B(;;x), with 0  x < 1; 2 R; > 0, is














where  (:) is the special function Gamma.
Proposition 2. Suppose assumptions A1-A3 hold. Then, the aggregate expected equilibrium
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
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w > 1
ERw =
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s
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1 + '~ xs

whitewhitewhitewhitewhitewhitewhitewhitewhitewhitewhitewhitewhite if s > 1
with ~ x = v + w~ xw, ' =
s
v and  =
w
v .
Proof. See Appendix A. 
The Euler integral form of the incomplete Beta functions is used in the proof to identify
it. An explicit form of the expected revenues are given in Appendix A by the means of the
expansion series of the incomplete Beta functions.
Assuming a linear relationship between eort and the valuations, s = w = 1, one can


















The relationship between the expected equilibrium expenditure for both players and the
values for w and s can be shown graphically (Figure 2 and Figure 3 with v = 2).























Figure 3: ERw for s = w = 1
The features of the individual expenditures that we observe in graphs 2 and 3 can be
extended to all values of s and w. It is thus possible to compare the standard all-pay auction
with exogenous valuations Vi(x) = vi with our setup where Vi(x) = v + ixi. Qualitatively,
i and i (when ~ x > 1) play the same role as vi in the standard framework and i (when
~ x  1) the inverse one and the results should comparatively similar with respect to individual
expected equilibrium expenditure. The following corollary conrms this intuition.
Corollary 3. Suppose assumptions A1-A3 hold. The individual expected equilibrium expen-
ditures
(i) of the \strong" player are increasing in w and decreasing in w if ~ x  1.
(ii) of the \strong" player are independent in s and s.
(iii) of the \weak" player are decreasing in s, increasing in s if ~ x  1.
(iv) of the \weak" player are increasing in w, decreasing in w if ~ x  1 and increasing in
w if ~ x > 1.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
We are not able to compute the sign of the derivatives of the role of the parameters s on
the \weak" player and w on the \strong" player's expected equilibrium expenditure when
~ x > 1. Yet, we did not nd any example which could contradict the intuition given above.
These results (Corollary 3) may have implications for the designer of a contest. If the
designer is interested in eliciting the largest amount of eort, due perhaps to spillovers or
in cases where the eort accrues directly to him, and if he can manipulate the contest tech-
nology of both players, Corollary 3 indicates the method to achieve this goal. In addition,
the contestants themselves have an incentive to inuence the parameters in the valuation
9funtions. A \weak" rm in an R&D race, for example, would prefer a larger value for w and
a smaller value for w if ~ x  1 (respectively a higher value if ~ x > 1) in order to decrease the
expected equilibrium payo of its competitor (see Corollary 1). If the contestant can chose
the parameters i and i at some cost before the beginning of the contest, the game can be
extended to include the pre-contest selection of the contest technology.
As in Section 3 for Corollary 2, we compare our setup where Vi(x) = v + ixi with the
standard all-pay auction where the valuation vw of the \weak player" is such that vw = ~ x.
Corollary 4. The expected equilibrium expenditures of the \strong" player in the all-pay
auction with endogenous rewards is lower than in the standard all-pay auction.
Proof. As vw > v + wxw for all eort inferior to ~ x, the \strong" player's mixed strategy
in the contest with rewards is stochastically dominated by the one in the standard contest.




Unfortunately, the eect on the expected equilibrium expenditures of the \weak" contes-
tant is not clear. Indeed, as the payo of the \strong bidder" decreases if vs > v +s~ xs, the
eect of the reward on the mixed strategy of the \weak" contestant is ambigue.
Conclusion
In this paper we examine a perfectly discriminating contest (all-pay auction) with two asym-
metric players and endogenous valuations in a complete information environment. Similar
to real-world situations, we postulate that the value of winning depends on the eort levels
invested. In particular, we assume that higher eort levels lead to higher prizes but that this
increase is smaller than the cost of eort. The contestants thus prefer to win at lower eort
levels. We believe that this set-up captures the nature of many contests such as R&D races,
lobbying games or sports events.
These properties of the valuation function together with the assumption that prizes in-
crease proportionally with eort lead to a unique functional form mapping eorts into prizes
and allow the explicit calculation of equilibrium strategies and expected equilibrium eort
levels for both contestant. As the valuation functions are not symmetric, we can dene
the \strong" contestant as the one having the higher eort limit. The \weak" contestant,
analogously, has the lower eort limit. Within these limits, valuations need not be ordered,
however, as (due to the asymmetry) both players may have the higher valuation at dierent
levels of eort. This notwithstanding, we show that the equilibrium strategies and expected
payos depend on the strength of the player.
10It is a well-known result that in this kind framework an equilibrium in pure strategies
does not exist. We therefore determine the mixed strategy equilibrium eort choices. In
equilibrium, the expected equilibrium payo of the \strong" player is positive and depends
on the parameters of both players' valuation function. In particular, it is decreasing in the
steepeness of the \weak" player's valuations.
Moreover, we are able to characterize the expected expenditure thanks to the incomplete
Beta functions. This result could be useful for applications of contests with endogenous re-
wards as in R&D races.
This paper leaves an open question for future research on pre-contests. How do contestants
select the contest technology which means their parameter i and i? That is an important
subject to study R&D races for example.
Appendix A: Proofs






















To arrive at equation (3) from (2) we apply the implicit function theorem to ~ x = v+w~ xw




1   ww~ xw 1










ss~ xs 1   ww~ xw 1
| {z }
maximum eect































ss~ xs 1   1

(8)
Using equations (2) and (3), ss~ xs 1 ww~ xw 1 = (ss~ xs 1 1)+~ xw dw
d~ x
. Then





 w ln ~ x = 0 from (1). In (8), the term between brackets
is negative from assumption A2 and the sign of
d~ x
dw
is given by (1).





Fi(x)dx for i = w;s.
1. Computation of ERw.
Let us denote ' =
s
v . If s = 1, it follows that
Z ~ x
0



















































The derivative in ~ x and the boundedness condition guarantee that ERw is positive.
If s > 1
Z ~ x
0















































































(1 + sj) ( 1
s + j)
(12)




1+'~ xs 2 (0;1) and
1
s > 0, equation (10) is the Euler integral representation of an incomplete Beta function and


































1 + '~ xs

(14)
As before, we nd (13) after change in variables as for equation (9) and (10).
Therefore,















(2 + sj) ( 2
s + j)
  ~ x














(1 + sj) ( 1
s + j)
2. Computation of ERs.
Let us denote  =
w




[(1   w)~ x +
1
w










which is positive as w < 1.
13If w > 1 the calculation is the same as for ERw, thus






















Proof of the Corollary 3. Let us remind that the expected equilibrium expenditure is given
by ERi = ~ x  
Z ~ x
0





























which is negative if ~ x  1.








v(~ xs   xs) + xs(~ x   x)






v~ xs ln ~ x   xs lnx(v   ~ x + x)




xs(~ x   x)lnx
(v + sxs)2 dx
 0














ss~ xs 1   1














ss~ xs 1   1
v + sxs dx which is negative if ~ x  1 and
non-negative if ~ x > 1.

14Appendix B: Ordered Valuations
An alternative way to analyze the problem would be to consider ordered valuations such
that Vi(x) > Vj(x) over the relevant range of x. Due to the form of the valuation func-

















Case (i): i > j, Positive Minima
If the maximum eort ~ x is superior to the eort level x? the mixed equilibrium strategies
for both players can be computed. Otherwise, there is not positive density in equilibrium.
The main dierence to the standard all-pay auction, in a sense, is that the non-participation
level of eort and the minimum eort level have to be distinguished. In particular, the players
do not participate below the threshold level x?. In the following, only the results that do not
follow straightforwardly from Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries
(1996) will be given.
Lemma 2. Under assumptions A1-A3, if the minimum eort x? is strictly positive and








Vi(~ x)   Vj(~ x)
Vi(x?)
Proof. Since the strategy spaces are the same, and expected utilities are constant at the
equilibrium we obtain Vi(~ x)   ~ x = Fj(x)Vi(x)   x and Vj(~ x)   ~ x = Fi(x)Vj(x)   x for all
x 2 [x?; ~ x]. As Vj(~ x)   ~ x = 0, the two last equations lead to the result. 
In this case, player i is \strong" and player j \weak" in the sense dened above with
probablitiy one for all x. Thus, with the exception of the common mass point at the lower
end of the distribution and the length of the strategy space, the mixed equilibrium strategies
should be the same as in the case with non-ordered valuations and i as the strong player. In
others words, for all x 2 [x?; ~ x]
Fi(x) =
x
v + jxj and Fj(x) =
v + i~ xi   ~ x + x
v + ixi :
Even if the distributions are the same, the expected revenue will dier as the strategy
spaces are dierent. We do not provide the closed form solution here, but the computation
is straightforward and similar to the one for non-ordered valuations.
Case (ii): i < j, Caps
15Here, two cases have to be distinguished. In both, player i is \strong" and player j is
\weak" for all x. If the maximum eort ~ x is inferior to x? the situation is as same as that of
ordered-valuations with endogenous rewards and the results of Proposition 1 apply. Alterna-
tively, the agents face a cap in their bids that they could not exceed such as ~ x > x?. This last
case was studied by Che and Gale (1998) with exogenous valuations. As in their paper, we
consider two cases. When x?  ~ x
2, there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium where the eort
of the players is x?. Otherwise, mixed strategies have to be computed. It can be shown that
the players have a nonzero density on (0;x0] and a zero density on (x0;x?) with a mass point
at x?.6 Then, with similar technical arguments than Che and Gale (1998) we nd that for all
x 2 [0;x0] Fi(x) = x
Vj(x) and Fj(x) = x
Vi(x) +
Vi(x0) Vj(x0)
Vi(x) and for all x 2 [x0;x?[ Fi(x) = x0
Vj(x0)
and Fj(x) = x0
Vi(x0) +
Vi(x0) Vj(x0)






> > > > <
> > > > :
x
v + jxj for all x 2 [0;x0]
x0
v + jx
0j for all x 2 [x0;x?[




> > > > > <
> > > > > :
x












0i for all x 2 [x0;x?[
1 for x = x?
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